Nov 1996, an HC-13OP crew from Portland, OR, call sign King 56, declared an emergency stating they had engine problems. Approximately 3 minutes later, all four engines flamed out and the aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean. The resulting safety investigation centered around three areas: an electromechanical problem with the propeller syncbrophaser, the fuel control system, or fuel system management. The US Air Force Safety Center enlisted the help of the 418 night Test Squadron at Edwards AFB to investigate different fuel management scenarios that hypothetically could lead to a four engine flameout. These scenarios were 1) auxiliary tank fuel boost pump failure, 2) auxiliary tank running dry, 3) fuselage tank boost pump failure, 4) fuselage tank running dry, 5 ) external tank boost pump failnre, 6) external tank running dry, 7) improper priming of the crossfeed manifold (main tank boost pumps on and of0 and 8) fuel gravity feed evaluation. All of these scenarios except for improper priming of the crossfeed manifold assumed that all four main tank boost pumps were off. If any of these points caused flameouts, proper engine recovety procedures would be verified during restart.
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Test safety planning was paramount since the success criteria for each test point was one or more flamed out engines. The primary question to be answered was how many engines to affect for each test point. It was obvious that a build up approach would be used, starting with mound test, then progressing to one engine affected in flight. The decision was made to allow up to three engines to be affected if the crew had confidence in the ability to restart the engines quickly. The test condition of 22,000 feet pressure altitude and 200 KIAS allowed the crew US. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright approximately 10 -15 minutes to get flamed restarted urior to a forced landing. If no fls out engines neouts were encountered at any of the test points, the scenarios would be flown with all four engines affected to prove that that none of these conditions would cause flameout.
Initial aircrew training was conducted in the HC-130 simulators at Kirtland AFB.
Test procedures were accomplished just as they would be done on the flights. Emphasis was placed on engine shutdowdrestart terminology and aircrew roles and responsibilities for the tests. In addition, all of the pilots practiced flameout approaches to Edwards AFB. Flameout approach procedures were developed during the simulator sessions, to include estimated altitudes required to safely glide to the field. These procedures and altitudes were later verified on a practice flight.
None of the test scenarios caused an engine flameout during the ground tests. The auxiliary tank running dry and improper priming scenarios did cause significant en=he fluctuations however. Since there were no flameouts during ground test, one engine was intentionally flamed out by running a main fuel tank dry to determine if the engine could be damaged by a high power flameout.
The test flights were sunctured so that all of the flameout scenarios were tested on each flight. An increasing number of engines were affected as the flights progressed. The flight test results were somewhat surprising. The most likely scenario from gronnd test, auxiliary tank mnning dry, did not produce any significant engine response during the airborne testing. Both fuselage tank scenarios, and both external tank scenarios repeatedly caused flameouts. The most likely culprit causing these responses was pressurized cabin air that could enter the fuel manifold through plumbing in the fuselage tanks. The fist restarts for each of these scenarios were accomplished using flight manuaI procedures. Later, engine recoveries from both a fluctuating and flamed out condition were performed by placing the appropriate main tank boost pump on. This procedure worked for all conditions. This test proved once again that a reliable aircraft with a good history can still have a few surprises. Changes are being made to the critical action procedures in the flight manuals of all USAF C-130s to reflect the results of this test. Simulator training is also being modified to cover this "new" emergency.
INTRODUCTION
On 22 Nov 1996, an HC-130P crew from Portland, OR, call sign King 56, declared an emergency stating they had engine problems. Approximately 3 minutes later, all four engines flamed out and the aircraft crashed into the Pacific Ocean. The resulting safety investigation centered around three areas: an elec!romechanical problem with the propeller synchrophaser, the fuel control system, or fuel system management. The US Air Force Safety Center enlisted the help of the 418 Flight Test Squadron (FLTS) at Edwards AFB to investigate fuel management scenarios that hypothetically could lead to a four engine flameout. These scenarios were 1) auxiliary tank fuel boost pump failure, 2) auxiliary tank running dry, 3) fuselage tank boost pump failure, 4) fuselage tank running dry, 5 ) external tank boost pump failure, 6) external tank running dry, 7) improper priming of the crossfeed manifold (main tank boost pumps on and off) and 8) fuel gravity feed evaluation. All of these scenarios except for improper priming of the crossfeed manifold assumed that all four main tank boost pumps were off, contrary to normal operating procedure. The objective of the test was to determine the Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engine response, as installed in the HC-130, to these scenarios which could introduce air into fuel lines andlor cause insufficient fuel flow to the engines at a typical cruise altitude and power setting.
Members of the 418 FLTS accomplished the flight test between 5 and 24 November 1997 at Edwards AFB, California, an a USAF HC-l30H(N). Two days of ground test and four flight test sorties were completed during this period with the results showing that it was possible to flame out engines using certain fuel management scenarios. This paper will outline the results of this testing and the flight test lessons that were learned -or proven again. It will also show how an old reliable aircraft with a good history can still have a few surprises.
There are also a few lessons learned for flight test that were proven again in this program. The simulator training accomplished prior to test was invaluable in preparing the crew for the test procedures and for its intended aftermathengine restart(s).
Airborne practice for nonstandard procedures -in this case flameout approaches -were essential. The first try at flameout approach should not be when all four propellers are feathered. Finally, the most likely hypothesis may not be the correct answer. The auxiliary fuel tank was thought to be the most likely scenario after ground testing. It was thought to be one of the least likely after flight test.
TEST ARTICLE DESCRIPTION
The HC-130 model variant of the C-130, first flown in 1964, was an aircraft initially modified to conduct search and rescue missions, provide a communication and control platform, in-flight refuel helicopters, and carry supplemental fuel for extending range or air refueling. It was powered by four Allison T56-A-15 tnrboprop engines of 4,910 shaft horsepower each. It differed from other models of the C-130 in that two fuselage fuel tanks could be carried in the cargo compartment. The associated fuel plumbing for those tanks was a permanent part of the aircraft. The tanks, however, were mounted to the cargo floor in the area between the wheel wells and could be removed pending mission requirements.
The USAF HC-130 fleet has two variants, the 'P' and the ' N models. The largest difference in the eyes of the fight test crew was that the ' N model had an auxiliary power unit that could be started in the air to deliver AC electrical power. The 'F" model did not. AC power is required to start the engines in the C-130 and in the very vocal opinion of the fight test crew an extra source of power could only be g o d . The fuel plumbing between the two models was determined to be close enough to be a valid test for both platforms. It was therefore decided to use an HC-l30(H)N, USAF serial number 90-2103.
The fuel system was a modified manifold-flow type, incorporating a fuel crossfeed system, a single point refueling and defueling system, a fuel dump system. and an air refueling system for in-flight transfer of fuel to receiver aircraft ( Figure 1 ). The system provided fuel supply for the four engines and the auxiliary power unit. Each engine was supplied fuel either directly from the respective main fuel tank or through the crossfeed manifold system from any tank TIT was recorded from the temperature datum thermocouple in each engine. Because of this, the temperacure datum amplifier was not connected to its corresponding thermocouple and no automatic engine overtemperature protection was available. This was not considered a limiting factor for the test. With a slightly increased vigilance the pilot could easily maintain the engines within normal temperatures. A cockpit mounted video camera recorded the engine instrument panel during testing. Audio also was recorded from the aircraft intercom system. A time code generator display was also installed and recorded to both video and data tapes. Several of the scenarios involved running fuel tanks dry. There was no way on a production aircraft in this configuration to uansfer fuel directly into the auxiliary and external fuel tanks. To facilitate in-flight refueling of these tanks, a switch was installed in the cockpit to operate the left-hand auxiliary refill valve solenoid circuit breaker, thus allowing the fuel transfer. This enabled the flight crew to transfer fuel using procedures that were normally reserved for ground single point refueling.
PLANNING
With the safety of flight implications inherent with the results of this test, it was imperative that the test be completed with all possible speed. The C-130 Program Office tasked the 418 FLTS to perform this test on 15 September 1997 and requested a preliminary report of results by 25 Novtmber 1997. The testing was to include 24 hours of ground testing and 24 hours of flight testing
The USAF Safety Center identified seven different fuel management scenarios that hypothetically could lead to a four engine flameout in the initial tasking. These scenarios were 1) auxiliary tank fuel boost pump failwe, 2) auxiliary tank running dry, 3) fuselage tank boost pump failure, 4) fuselage tank running dry, 5) external tank boost pump failure, 6 ) external tank running dry, 7) improper priming of the crossfeed manifold (main tank boost pumps on and off).
The Air Force Flight Test Center test team also identified the need to baseline the engine's ability to operate under fuel gravity feed from the main fuel tanks. This led to the last scenario, 8 ) fuel gravity feed evaluation. The objective of the test was to determine the Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engine response, as installed in the HC-130, to these scenarios which could introduce air into fuel lines and/or cause insufficient fuel flow to the engines at a typical cruise altitude and power semng.
There were concerns raised by maintenance personnel that flameouts at high power could produce engine damage, preventing an air s m . Specifically, they were concerned about shock cooling on the turbine blades inducing stress fractures. The engine experts at the C-130 engine depot at Kelly AFB did not think this scenario was likely, hut they could not completely rule out the possibility. Not wanting to leave anything to chance, it was decided to closely inspect the fist engine that flamed out on the ground and in flight to determine if there were any visible damage to the turbine section. If none were seen after these events, it could be reasonably assumed that this would not he a limiting factor for the test. If the engine showed damage, it would seriously limit the test since it would not be desirable to restart an engine that could possibly come apart during the process.
With the schedule concerns still looming, a spare engine was prepositioned at Edwards AFB to quickly change the engine in case of failure.
It was decided to execute the Fuselage Tank Dry, Fuselage Tank Pump Failed, Auxiliary Tank Dry, Auxiliary Tank Pump Fail, and the Improper Primed Crossfeed Manifold scenarios on the ground. The goal was to determine if any of these scenarios would happen regardless of flight conditions and to flameout one engine at high power for the turbine inspection. The ground tests were to begin with one engine affected by the specified fuel s w a t i o n scenario and then progress through four engines affected. There were two reasons for this build up during ground test. With the concern over possible engine damage, no one wished to go directly to the four engine test point and damage all four engines at once. The second reason was the thought that it might be possible to gain insight into engine reaction to the various scenarios. This insight would be valuable to the pilots during the flight test portion to identify impending to serve as a backup electrical power supply. To take care of hydraulic pressure, the #3 engine would be left windmilling on all three engine test points if all of the affected engines flamed out The #3 engine was considered the best alternative to keep the drag from the windmilling propeller as close to centerline of the aircraft as possible. It would not be feathered unless there were two good engines operating. The possibility was left open in the test plan to affect all four engines during test. However, this eventuality was reserved for the possibility that there had been no torque fluctuations during the one, two, or three engine tests for any scenario. We planned to perform the four engine test to prove these scenarios could not have caused the four engine flameout experienced by King 56.
A critical factor to the test team's success in meeting the demanding schedule was the priority given to this program at the AFFTC. The Flameout approaches were also practiced to Edwards AFB in the simulator. This was an area of concern since there are no flight manual procedures or performance data for a flameout approach. It was determined that the best conlipation to start this approach was gear and flaps up, with the outboard engines feathered and the inboard propellers windmilling. The feathered propellers lowered the drag and helped the flameout glide to the field. The windmilling propellers preserved hydraulic pressure to the flight controls, flaps, and gear. The data available indicated that a windmilling propeller would maintain sufficient pressure through landing. Although the C-130 has a fully reversible fight control system, the forces r e q u i d to control the aircraft without the hydraulic boost was excessive and was not considered a landable contipation. The gear was lowered when landing was assured. Flaps were lowered only to shorten the aimpoint. The approach was a straight-in to runway 22. It was thought that if the approach was short then there were several different choices of lakebed runways prior to the hard surface runway. Fluctuations of less than 1000 in-lbs were considered part of normal engine operation and therefore were not significant.
Flameout was defined as when rpm dropped below 94 percent. At 94 percent, the engine acceleration bleed valves opened in the compressor section and the engine rpm would drop to a windmilling speed (40-50% rpm). It was at this point the engine was feathered if called for. Following a build up approach, the first few test points in which positive results were obtained in fight were allowed to go no further than the fluctuating stage. After a successful recovery was observed, the one and two engine scenarios were allowed to proceed to flameout. The three engine cases were generally allowed to continue until torque had dropped to 4,000 in-lb on all three engines prior to recovery. In the progression of the test point, if the first two engines flamed out prior to the third engine reaching 4,000 in-lb of torque, the flamed out engines were feathered if an outboard and allowed to windmill if an inboard. A summary of test results is included in Table 1 . WO fuel starvation scenarios tested produced engine flameout on the ground. The fuselage tank and external tank pump failure and tank running empty scenarios caused significant engine power loss and flameouts in flight. The left bank evaluation did not conclusively demonstrate a correlation of engine response with aircraft banking and maneuvering. The tested recovery procedure consistently recovered torquefluctuating and flamed-out engines. The fuselage tank pump failure flameouts were unexpected test results because pressurized cabin air was expected to force fuselage tank fuel into the fuel manifold to feed the enpines. This obviously did not occur. The cause of the flameouts was thought to be cabin pressurized air entering either through the empty left fuselage tank or through the right fuselage tank's vent valve. These results are significant because there is a flight manual procedure, "Fuselage Tanks Using Cabin Pressurization", which employs a very similar setup to this test point. This procedure was meant to deliver an alternate means of providing fuselage tank fuel in the case of a dual boost pump failure.
In table 4, note the increased engine inlet pressure in flight (7 to 8 psia) compared to the 4 to 6 psia present during the auxiliary tank scenarios. The cabin differential pressure was approximately 7.4 psi. This pressurized air was travelling from the fuselage tanks to the engines of interest. The engine reverted to gravity feed during ground test of this scenario when the aircraft was not pressurized, hut the engines did not establish gravity feed in flight. This supports the theory that cabin pressurized air caused engine flameouts by blocking main tank fuel Tal from gravity feeding. However, the mechanism by which pressurized cabin air enters the fuel lines has not been confirmed. This theory cannot be confirmed without further investigation.
Even without further investigation, the conclusion can be made that if a fuselage tank boost pump fails while crossfeediing engines with their main tank boost pumps off and no other boost pumps are providing pressure to the manifold, those engines are likely to flameout. Therefore, the caution contained in the "Fuselage Tanks Using Cabin Pressurization" flight manual pertaining to possible erratic engine operation should be upgraded to a warning.
Fuselage Tank Empiy
The aircraft was configured with the main tank boost pumps off and the engine@) under test feeding from the right fuselage fuel tank with the #1 boost pump on. The right fuselage fuel tank was allowed to run empty. Although no response was observed during ground test, this scenario caused engine flameouts in flight. Fuselage tank running empty test results are included in Table 5 . The aircraft was configured so the engines under test were established on crossfeed from an external fuel tank. The external fuel pump was then switched to OFF to simulate failure. This scenario caused engine flameouts in flight.
External tank pump failure test results are included in Table 6 . During three-engine flight tests of the external tank pump failure scenario, engine #2 experienced significant torque, TIT, and fuel flow fluctuations approximately 2 minutes and 30 seconds before engines #4 and #1 followed. Typical engine response from this scenario is shown in Figure 3 .
When feeding from the external tanks the crossfeed manifold was connected to the dump manifold through a one-way check valve. All fuselage tank manual isolation valves were in the normal open position which pressurized the dump manifold to cabin pressure. Therefore, when feeding from external tanks, pressurized cabin air could force its way to the engines through a one-way check valve if the pressure in the crossfeed manifold drops low enough.
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This theory is supported by the fact that engine fuel pump inlet pressure slowly rose above atmospheric pressure as the engines experienced power loss leadmg to flameout (see Figure 3 ). This indicated cabin pressurized air was likely forcing its way into the crossfeed manifold, slowly blocking main tank fuel from gravity feeding, and flaming out engines. This theory c m o t be contirmed without further investigation.
If an external tank boost pump fails while crossfeeding engines with their main tank boost pumps off and no other boost pumps are providing pressure to the crossfeed manifold, those engine are likely to flameout. . w e 3 External Tank Enrpj.
The aircraft was configured so the engines under test were established on crossfeed from an external fuel tank. That enrernal fuel tank was then allowed to run dry. This scenario caused engine flameouts in fight. External tank running empty test results are included in Table 7 . 
Improper Priming
During ground test, fuel was drained back into the fuselage tank through the single point refueling (SPR) valve. This procedure drew air into the fuel lines through the #2 main tank. The SPR valve was then closed and the right fuselage tank boost pump was turned on to force the air to the engines.
During initial flight tests of the one-and two-engine scenarios, air was inuoduced into the fuel lines by using cabin pressure to force air through the empty left fuselage tank into the dump and crossfeed manifolds. The amount of air that was introduced into the fuel lines by these procedures was much greater than a leak could produce. Therefore, these results are unlikely to occur operationally.
A more realistic scenario was evaluated in three-engine flight tests. The three-engine flight test point used the same procedure to introduce air into the fuel lies. However, the aircraft was then configured to crossfeed from the left auxiliary tank, thereby purging the crossfeed manifold of air and leaving a smaller air mass in the fuel lines between the fuselage tanks and the right external crossfeed valve.
The aircraft was initially configured with all engines feeding from the main tanks. The fuel lines leadiig from the fuselage tank to the crossfeed manifold were then charged with air. The main tank boost pumps were off for the engines being tested.
All other engines were configured to be fed directly from the main tanks, crossfeed valve closed and boost pump on. Next, the engines under test were switched over to feed from the right fuselage fuel tank without priming the crossfeed manifold. Engine response was observed and the test point was allowed to continue until after 10 minutes no response was noted or fuselage tank crossfeed was determined to have established by the quantity in the right fuselage tank decreasing or torque fluctuations or flameout occurred.
Improper priming scenarios caused severe but brief engine responses during ground and flight test. The more realistic procedure, which introduced air between the fuselage tanks and the right external crossfeed valve, did not produce any engine response during three-engine flight test. Improper priming test results are included in Table 8 . ' using the realistic procedure.
The procedure that introduced air into the crossfeed manifold caused large rapid engine power loss (to zero torque) during one-and two-engine flight tests. Engine fluctuations lasted less than 40 seconds as the engines recovered when pressurized fuel from the fuselage tank boost pump reached the engines. The improper priming with main tank boost pumps on scenario did not cause any engine response
Gravity Feed Evaluation
The aircraft was configured so that the #I engine was feeding from the left auxiliary fuel tank The #1 main tank boost pump was off. All other engines were configured to be fed directly from their respective main tank, crossfeed valve closed and boost pump on. Next, the #1 engine crossfeed valve was closed. Engine response was observed for 3 minutes and no noticeable engine response was observed. Each individual engine was increased to maximum power while gravity feeding. Gravity feed sustained maximum engine power at approximately 1,083 TIT, which produced approximately 15,000 in-lb torque and 1,500 pph fuel flow. The fact that no abnormal engine response occurred indicated that the engines smoothly uansitioned from crossfeeding from the anxiliary tank to gravity feeding from their main tank.
Recovery Procedure Evaluation
The proposed recovery procedure, 1. Main tank boost pumps -"ON" (E), 2. Main tank crossfeed valves -"CLOSED" (E) was tested concurrently with all other test objectives. The recovery procedure was used for every torque fluctuating engine recovery, after the test point success criteria were complete, as part of the test point cleanup procedure. The recovery procedure was demonstrated on an inboard flamed-out engine windmilling at approximately 45 percent rpm, outboard flamed-out engine (less than 94 percent rpm), and multiple engines experiencing torque fluctuations below 4000 inlb.
The engines recovered from torque fluctuating conditions within 5 seconds after their main tank boost pumps were turned on. When the procedure was conducted on flamedout engmes, engine start occurred more slowly. The longest time noted was 20 seconds between main tank boost pump on and engine #2 start when en,he #2 was flamed out and rotating at approximately 45 percent rpm. Overall, 22 successful recoveries of torque fluctuating engines were accomplished in 22 attempts and 7 successful recoveries of flamed-out engines were accomplished in 7 attempts. The outboard flameout engine was recovered as rpm was passing 93 percent. No attempt was made to recover multiple engines with a single main tank boost pump; however, based on the rapid rate that the crossfeed manifold was pressurized and the rapid recovery of the engines, this should also he possible. The quickest way to pressurize the crossfeed manifold is to turn all four main tank boost pumps on.
While not pan of the recovery evaluation, it was noted that the unprimed fuel line scenarios on two-engine fight tests also demonstrated the same recovery mechanism when the fuselage tank boost pump was turned on. Fluctuating engines recovered when the pressurized fuel from the fuselage tank boost pump reached the engines. Torque fluctuating engines recovered within 5 seconds of fuselage tank boost pump on.
CONCLUSION
This test conclusively demonstrated that it is possible to experience multiple engine loss due to fuel starvation given the right (or wrong!) fuel panel setup. The test was designed to get the bottom line results in minimum time so many of the questions on the mechanisms of how these flamwuts occur are not answered. While it would be nice to know the answers to the questions from an academic standpoint, the importance of determining the setup and recovery of these potentially deadly scenarios cannot he overlooked. There was evidence that hinted there was a problem with engine flameouts on "2-130 aircraft if the fuel panel was misconfigured. The overall purpose of this test was to determine if there were hazardous configurations, and if there were, what would recover the aircraft to a safe condition.
It is not a normal flight manual procedure to fly with the main tank boost pumps off. This test conclusively proved that performing such an act is an extremely bad idea. When feeding from the external or fuselage tanks, it was repeatedly shown that engine flameouts could occur when the main tank boost pumps are off and either the operating boost pump fails, or the tank NILS dry. Testing with the auxiliary ranks was inconclusive, so flight in those configurations should also be avoided. It was demonstrated that turning on the main tank boost pump would recover an engine from one of these fuel starvation scenarios by restoring a positive flow of fuel to the engine.
LESSONS LEARNED
Simulator training prior to Mght test is invaluable. The time spent in the simulator likely saved twice as much flight time by allowing the crewmembers U, practice all of the critical procedures in a benign environment. For this test there were hours of boredom followed by a few minutes of very intense activity. The simulator allowed the crew to skip over the setup phase (hours of boredom) and concentrate upon engine flameout and recovery (minutes of intense activity).
were practiced and refined so that when the actual event occurred in the aircraft, there were no mistakes.
Sirnulatom still can't substitute for actual tlight The flameout approaches flown in the aircraft brought out issues that were not seen in the simulator. The most notable was the need to have extra airspeed when arresting the aircraft's sink rate to touchdown. The first flameout approach in the aircraft resulted in a go around when the pilot realized that tidbit of information at about 75 feet AGL. 
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